Ages and Themes of Income Taxation: Savings and Investment by Osgood, Russell K.
Cornell Law Review
Volume 68
Issue 4 April 1983 Article 5
Ages and Themes of Income Taxation: Savings and
Investment
Russell K. Osgood
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Russell K. Osgood, Ages and Themes of Income Taxation: Savings and Investment, 68 Cornell L. Rev. 521 (1983)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol68/iss4/5
THE AGES AND THEMES OF INCOME
TAXATION: SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT*
Russell K. Osgoodf
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. T HEM ES ................................................... 522
A. Revenue-Income ...................................... 522
B. Subsidization ......................................... 524
C. R egulation ........................................... 526
D. Tax Expenditure Analysis ............................ 530
II. ERTA CHANGES .......................................... 532
A . IR A s ................................................. 533
B. All Saver Certificates ................................. 534
C. Qualified Reinvested Dividend Plans ................. 535
III. SAVINGS AND INCOME TAXATION .......................... 535
A. Revenue-Income ...................................... 535
B. Subsidization ......................................... 542
C. Regulation ........................................... 543
1. A Tax-Based National Enterprzse Poli ............... 544
2. Other 1981 and 1982 Act Provisions .................. 546
IV. THE FUTURE ............................................. 550
CONCLUSION ................................................... 552
This article discusses certain provisions of the Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA)I as they relate to the three major themes of
federal income taxation: revenue-income, subsidization, and regulation.
The article first develops a typology of these themes based on current
law and ideology. It then briefly describes certain of the ERTA provi-
sions that Congress designed to encourage savings and critically evalu-
ates the arguments of Professor Andrews favoring movement of the
income tax toward a consumption tax model. Finally, the article sug-
gests that the ERTA changes, rather than moving toward a consump-
tion tax, instead resemble various programs launched in Britain,
* Copyright © 1983 by Russell K. Osgood.
t Associate Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. The author thanks Theodore Eisen-
berg, Alan L. Feld, Henry Hansmann, Dean Peter W. Martin, Dale A. Oesterle, and William
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Sweden, and France to encourage or produce national investment in
particular industries or in the business sector generally.
I
THEMES
For years there has been doubt, perhaps even cynicism, 2 whether
federal income taxation, as reflected in the Internal Revenue Code, is
legal either in nature or content. Perhaps taxation embodies accounting
or administrative notions operating in the substratum of public finance
economics, but it is not hard and fast law, like an offer and an accept-
ance creating a contract. Even the doubters concede, however, the legal
aspects of taxation; the criminal sanctions and the common law develop-
ment in the corporate taxation area are two examples. Apart from these
and a few other exceptions, the Code as a whole is not accepted as a
legal construct.
Congress's rapid-fire passage of major revenue legislation in seven
of the past nine years reinforces the doubts. One possible response is to
assert that the Code embodies only a few fundamental rules.3 Another
response is to slog away in isolation with contented and mostly docile
students, happy to receive concrete and practical learning. A third re-
sponse, which I will develop below by discussing a few changes made by
the 1981 and 1982 acts, is based on the perception that the Code has
three major themes and that tax lawyers are uniquely positioned to eval-
uate how the vast mass of rules in the Code relates to those themes. The
three current themes date from separate ages in the history of the Code
and to some extent center on different substantive areas of tax law.
A. Revenue-Income,
The first theme of the Code is to raise revenue through taxation of
income when appropriate. This was the central concern of both the six-
teenth amendment and the Revenue Act of 1913 which established the
federal income tax. Congress made fundamental choices in defining in-
come. Although most accretions to wealth are income, gifts4 and the
proceeds of life insurance paid as a result of the insured's death 5 are not.
For a variety of reasons-prudence and hardship being the most impor-
tant--other accretions to wealth are also excluded from the recipient's
2 Although it is difficult to prove this assertion, the notion that taxation is not quite
"law" is very common among legal commentators. It may be its instability or its primacy as
an economic tool that has caused this cynicism. For an expression of similar sentiments, see
Hickman, Where to Go From Here:. A Lawyer's View, 35 NAT'L TAX J. 269 (1982); Royster, Our
Inconstant Lawgivers, Wall St. J., Jan. 26, 1983, at 30, col. 3.
3 J. FREELAND, S. LIND & R. STEPHENS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FUNDAMENTALS
OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION xxiii (4th ed. 1982).
4 I.R.C. § 102(a) (1976).
5 Id § 101(a)(1) (1976 & West Supp. 1983).
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income. For example, the Code does not tax unrealized appreciation
until a disposition of the underlying asset occurs,6 and ignores the
growth of the savings element in annuities until payment.
7
The precise meaning of the revenue-income theme of the statute
continues to unfold. Vigorous debate continues about the tax treatment
of fringe benefits,8 universally conceded to be accretions to wealth but
thus far largely left out of the tax net because of administrative com-
plexity or the political power of the recipients. Critics attack the failure
to tax all the earnings9 of a foreign, wholly owned subsidiary to its do-
mestic shareholders. Although this treatment is consistent with domes-
tic shareholder taxation,' 0 the critics" maintain that the subsidiary's
earnings, particularly if it operates in a low- or no-tax jurisdiction, are
an accretion to the wealth of a controlling shareholder.
Discussions of the revenue-income theme tend to overlook the two
distinct income tax regimes in the Code; one governing individuals in
their personal capacity, the other investors and businesses. 12 Most com-
mentators characterize the individual income tax, in theory, as an accre-
tion tax on income above a minimum level established by the personal
exemption and zero bracket amount. 13 This theory fails descriptively
because it neglects the overt subsidization provisions discussed below.
The investor-business income tax, by contrast, taxes net income, which
is computed after deducting the cost of doing business or owning the
asset. Some adjustments are made annually against income, such as sal-
aries paid to employees.' 4 Other expenditures, such as an attbrney's fee
6 Id § 1001 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
7 Id § 72(a) (1976) recognizes the inherent-gain element in an annuity only as pay-
ments are "received."
8 Section 801 of ERTA prohibits the issuance in final form before January 1, 1984, of
any "regulation providing for the inclusion of any fringe benefits in gross income." Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 801, 95 Stat. 172, 349.
9 I.R.C. § 951 (1976) only requires recognition of certain types of income, labelled Sub-
part F income, to a United States shareholder. A United States shareholder is defined as a
person or entity that owns 10% "or more of the total combined voting power of all classes of
stock. . . ." Id § 951o(b) (1976). Other income is not recognized until there is a distribution
by the foreign subsidiary.
10 Shareholders in a domestic corporation may be in receipt of income only if there is a
"distribution of property." Id. § 301(a) (1976).
11 P. MCDANIEL & H. AULT, INTRODUCTION TO UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL
TAxATION 201-03 (2d ed. 1981).
12 Alan Feld's article in this symposium issue is an exception. Feld, Fairness in Rate Cuts
in the Individual Income Tax, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 429 (1983). A prime example of the tensions
this dichotomy creates is determining which educational expenses are deductible under I.R.C.
§ 162 (1976) and Treas. Reg. 1.162-5 (1967). See, e.g., Marlin v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 560
(1970) (deductibility of educational travel expenses).
13 1 S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. MCDANIEL & H. AULT, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
239-98 (1972). The authors also indicate that certain hardship deductions, such as the medi-
cal expense deduction, may allow a better measuring of "income" because the experience is
usually an involuntary expenditure. Id at 247.
14 I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (1976).
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incurred to search a title when an investor acquires property are
recouped only on a disposition. 15
The dichotomy in the revenue-income theme between personal in-
come and business-investment gains results in part from the difficulties
of defining and measuring income. The relationship between personal
expenses and the production of income is too tenuous to be used to eval-
uate deductibility as in the business-investment context. 16 This article
focuses on the personal income of individuals in analyzing whether the
ERTA provisions embody a consumption tax ideal as some commenta-
tors assert. Businesses and investors have long had, in the form of depre-
ciation allowances, 17 a mechanism which relieves the "need" for a
deduction for savings.
B. Subsidization
The second theme of the Code, a controversial one, is the subsidiza-
tion of certain taxpayer activities.' 8 Subsidization occurs through tax
deferral, delayed recognition of income, or a permanent forgiveness.
The provisions dealing with domestic international sales corporations
(DISCs) are an example of subsidization through delayed recognition.
A DISC is not a taxable entity.19 Although its shareholders are taxa-
ble,20 a portion of DISC income, computed by reference to a formula
which weights2' increasing export sales, is not taxed to the shareholder
until the DISC shares are sold or otherwise disposed of,2 2 the earnings
are distributed, or the DISC is disqualified. 23
Forgiveness is the least common method of subsidization. The resi-
dential energy credit is an example: If a taxpayer installs a more effi-
cient oil burner in his home, he may claim a credit of 15% of the cost of
15 Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(c) (1958).
16 See I.R.C. § 262 (1976) (disallowing deductions for personal expenditures). Consump-
tion-tax advocates have argued that one of the advantages of their approach would be to
eliminate some of the line-drawing necessitated by the dichotomy. Bradford, The Possibilities
for an Erpenditure Ta, 35 NAT'L TAx J. 243, 246 (1982).
17 I.R.C. § 167 (1976, Supp. V 1981 & West Supp. 1983); id § 168 (Supp. V 1981 &
West Supp. 1983).
18 For example, until December 31, 1981, if a taxpayer substantially rehabilitated a
certified historic structure or a structure located in a registered historic district, he received a
faster write off of the rehabilitation costs than if he rehabilitated a 1950s plant. I.R.C.
§§ 167(o), 191 (1976); Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, §§ 2124(a)(1), (d)(1), 90
Stat. 1520, 1916-19, repealed by Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95
Stat. 172, 239-40. ERTA replaced these provisions with a liberalized investment tax credit
(25%) for the costs of rehabilitating a certified historic structure. I.R.C. §§ 46(a)(2)(A)(iv),
46(a)(2)(F)(i), 48(g)(2)(B)(iv) (Supp. V 1981). A less generous credit is available for rehabili-
tation of structures at least 30 years (15%) or 40 years (20%) old. Id § 46(a)(2) (F).
19 I.R.C. § 991 (1976).
20 Id § 995 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
21 Id § 995(e) (1976).
22 Id § 995(c), () (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
23 Id § 995(b)(2) (1976).
[Vol. 68:521
SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT
the burner up to $2,000.24 This has the effect of reducing the taxpayer's
liability for that year by up to $300.
A number of current Code rules which delay taxation may argua-
bly be characterized either as a subsidy or as the correct determination
of a difficult timing question. A good example is the general rule that
corporate reorganizations 25 with continuity of ownership 26 and enter-
prise 27 are not recognition events, as long as an investor begins and ends
with similar certificates of interest. On the one hand, the investor termi-
nates his interest in one entity and commences to own part of a new one.
On the other hand, the old entity has been subsumed, and continues to
exist in the new entity.
The debate over whether to characterize decisions to delay the im-
position of tax as subsidies or mere timing considerations does not imply
that the accounting aspect of the revenue-income theme is inseparable
from the subsidization theme. For example, the acceleration of write-
offs for certified historic structures28 cannot be justified on the basis of a
"true" income tax accounting scheme. Conversely, not requiring a cash
basis taxpayer to take into income a future pension right in which he has
no vested interest, involves no subsidization.
29
A school of tax academics led by Professor Surrey has pushed subsi-
dization analysis to its limits. 30 Yet even adherents of the Surrey ap-
proach concede that many rules which demonstrably affect tax
incidence, such as the foreign tax credit of section 901 and the exemp-
tion of certain organizations from taxation by section 501, are not
subsidies.3 '
Subsidization also may be negative; the Code may alter the appli-
cation of a general principle of taxation to a class of transactions
thought to be undesirable for nontax reasons. For instance, one may not
amortize the cost of, or take a loss on account of, the demolition of a
certified historic structure.32 From January 1, 1977, until December 31,
1981, a taxpayer could only deduct expenses incurred in attending up to
24 I.R.C. § 44C(b)(1) (Supp. V 1981 & West Supp. 1983).
25 I.R.C. § 368(a) (1976, Supp. V 1981 & West Supp. 1983) defines the types of reorga-
nizations which are granted nonrecognition treatment under I.R.C. §§ 354, 355, 356, 361, or
362.
26 The continuity ofownership requirement has both a statutory basis in some reorgani-
zation definitions, e.g., I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B) (1976), and a general common law basis, now
reflected in Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(a) (1976).
27 Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (1980).
28 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
29 I.R.C. § 402 (1976, Supp. V 1981 & West Supp. 1983) thus is reconcilable in this
context with the "normal" Code rule set out in I.R.C. § 83(a) (1976 & West Supp. 1983).
30 See 1 S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. McDANIEL & H. AULT, supra note 14, at 239-98.
31 Id at 242-43 (foreign tax credit and exempt organizations not listed in tax expendi-
ture budget); see also S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM 346 n.24 (1973).
32 I.R.C. § 280B (1976, Supp. V 1981 & West Supp. 1983).
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two conventions outside the United States and certain of its
possessions.
33
Some of the negative subsidization provisions, such as the foreign
convention limitation, are attributable in part to the difficulties of ap-
plying one or more of the basic tax rules. For example, was it "ordinary
and necessary," within the meaning of section 162, that the American
Bar Association meet in London? The rules may also reflect a legislative
redetermination of a factual issue on which the courts have gone astray.
Under one view, for example, foreign conventions are inherently vaca-
tions and deductions for such vacations should not be permitted to di-
minish revenues on a case-by-case basis.34
Many negative subsidization provisions merely are attempts to dis-
courage undesirable activities by calling off normal tax rules. For exam-
ple, bribes and kickbacks, which are illegal under American law, are not




The third theme of the tax law is to regulate certain areas of na-
tional concern. The regulatory theme can only be related to revenue
generation in a tortured fashion. The Code presents three major exam-
ples of this in the provisions relating to exempt organizations. There is
no satisfactory rationale to connect congressional concern for controlling
and regulating charities with the exempt organization regime of the
Code. Self-dealing by a manager of a foundation, which negatively af-
fects the foundation's tax status, does not relate logically to the founda-
tion's tax exemption.36 Self-dealing is primarily an issue of trust or
charity law, which until the Tax Reform Act of 1969,37 was a matter of
state concern.
Another example of the regulatory use of the tax law is the vast and
intricate system of rules which governs pensions and other forms of de-
ferred and current compensation. A fundamental precept of most of
these rules present in the pension area since 1942, is that benefits must
33 I.R.C. § 274(h) (1976), Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 602(a), 90
Stat. 1520, 1572, amended by Taxation-Individuals Living Abroad, Pub. L. No. 96-608, 94
Stat. 3550, 3552-53 (1980).
34 I.R.C. § 274(h) (1976).
35 Id § 162(c)(1) (1976 & West Supp. 1983).
36 I.R.C. § 4941 (1976, Supp. V 1981 & West Supp. 1983) punishes such self-dealing.
37 In a recent series of articles, Professor Hansmann has suggested a reconstitution of the
state and federal regimes as they relate to the variety of nonprofit institutions that would have
the effect of reinvigorating the states' role. See Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law,
129 U. PA. L. REV. 497 (1981); Hansmann, The Role ofNonprofit Enterprie, 89 YALE L.J. 835
(1980); Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate Income Taxa-
lion, 91 YALE LJ. 54 (1981).
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be awarded on a nondiscriminatory basis.38 Nondiscrimination does not
flow logically from the deduction provided for contributions and the
nonincludability of benefits. A company, arguably, should be able to
discriminate in awarding pensions39 since it may discriminate in setting
compensation and still get a deduction. The nondiscrimination princi-
ple is based on a congressional determination that discrimination
against lower paid people is unfair.
The discrimination issue also can be discussed in terms of the
Code's subsidization theme. Although Congress has decided to subsi-
dize only nondiscriminatory plans, the vastness of subchapter D, includ-
ing the prohibited transaction rules, demonstrates that subsidization is
not the sole concern. The primary goal of the regime is the regulation of
employee benefit plans. The cases that have arisen since the Pension
Reform Act in 1974, involving dereliction by plan trustees or sponsors in
the maintenance of their plan or observance of certain Code rules, sup-
port this view. The Code's penalty for a number of these infractions is
disqualification of the offending plan4 with attendant nullification of
the various tax benefits accorded the plan's sponsor and its beneficiaries.
This sanction is rarely imposed; the Labor Department or the Service
typically seeks remedies short of deprivation of the tax benefits.4' The
tax benefits thus have become automatic and irrevocable, and the other
regulatory tax rules are enforced by sanctions other than the forfeiture
of those benefits.
A third regulatory regime centers on sections 103 and 103A, which
govern the permissible uses of the proceeds of tax exempt obligations.
This regime, similar to the charity and pension schemes, is characterized
by a subsidy that flows primarily to someone other than the exempted
activity or entity. Although the charitable contribution provides a sub-
sidy to wealthy donors, it operates, through its connection with the pri-
vate-foundation rules,)42 to regulate the activities of the recipient.
Charities, pension trusts, and state and local governments also receive a
subsidy. State and local obligations, for example, sell at a lower coupon
38 I.R.C. § 401(a)(4) (1976, Supp. V 1981 & West Supp. 1983) (qualified pensions); id.
§ 105(h)(2) (Supp. V 1981 & West Supp. 1983) (medical expense reimbursement plans); id
§ 120(c)(1) (1976 & West Supp. 1983) (group legal services plans).
39 One permissible form of benefit discrimination is that benefits may vary according to
income. Id. § 402(a)(5) (1976, Supp. V 1981 & West Supp. 1983); Treas. Reg. § 1.401-
4(a)(2)(i) (1963).
40 For instance, a plan ceases to be qualified if it does not conform to the participation
rules, I.R.C. § 410 (1976, Supp. V 1981 & West Supp. 1983), or vestig rules, id. § 411.
41 This phenomenon is illustrated by the conduct of both the Service and the Depart-
ment of Labor in dealing with the numerous violations of law related to one of the Teamster
plans. See, e.g., Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Health & Welfare Fund v. Old
Sec. Life Ins. Co., 600 F.2d 671 (7th Cir. 1979).
42 I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)(vii), (b)(1)(C) (1976).
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rate because of their tax exemption. A significant portion of such sub-
sidy, however, goes to someone other than the exempt activity or
entity.
43
Control over the uses of the proceeds of state and local obligations
also constitutes a regulatory regime because of the extensiveness of the
nonrevenue rules. Sections 103 and 103A limit the amounts of such pro-
ceeds which can be used for industrial facilities,4" residential mortgage
financing,45 and arbitrage. 46 In comparison, the Code exempts sports
facilities,4 7 qualified mass commuting vehicles,48 and certain other fa-
vored projects 49 from these limitations. The large number of private
ruling letters issued under sections 103 and 103A 50 demonstrates the reg-
ulatory scope of these rules.
A recent ruling, Revenue Ruling 83-7, 5t illustrates the complexity
of the rules governing state and local obligations and their unrelatedness
to revenue generation. The ruling demonstrates further, how exceptions
to the Code's denials of tax exemption threaten to swallow up such
denials.
Section 103 denies the federal exemption to obligations of a state or
local government if they are "industrial development bonds. '52 Indus-
trial development bonds are bonds whose proceeds will be used directly
or indirectly in a trade or business carried on by a nonexempt person
and whose servicing is tied "in whole or in major part" to a property
used in a trade or business or is made from payments "in respect of [the]
property. '53 This provision is designed to prevent local governments
from passing their exempt-interest benefit through to nonexempt
activities.
Sections 103(b) (4), (5), and (6) call off the denial in the case of cer-
tain favored projects. Although Revenue Ruling 83-7 does not identify
the particular project involved, the ruling notes that the project is
within the section 103(b) (4) sports facilities category. Section 103(b) (4)
requires that "substantially all of the proceeds" of an excepted issuance
be applied to the favored purpose. The regulations,54 apparently as a
gloss on the words "issued" and "used to provide," call off the exception
43 Indeed, the cost of the subsidy to the United States can exceed the net benefit to the
subsidized activity. See infta note 58 and accompanying text.
44 I.R.C. § 103(b) (1976, Supp. V 1981 & West Supp. 1983).
45 Id § 103A (Supp. V 1981 & West Supp. 1983).
46 Id § 103(c) (1976, Supp. V 1981 & West Supp. 1983).
47 Id § 103(b)(4)(B) (1976 & West Supp. 1983).
48 Id § 103(b)(4)(I), (b)(9) (Supp. V 1981 & West Supp. 1983).
49 See id § 103(b)(4) (1976, Supp. V 1981 & West Supp. 1983).
50 Lexis research shows 253 I.R.C. § 103 private letter rulings during 1981.
51 1983-2 I.R.B. 6.
52 I.R.C. § 103(b)(1) (1976 & West Supp. 1983).
53 Id. § 103(b)(2).
54 Treas. Reg. § 1.103-8(a) (5) (iv) (1980).
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to denial of the section 103(a) exemption to industrial revenue bonds if a
pre-issuance "substantial user" of a facility continues to use it.55 The
substantial user requirement was developed to prevent the use of the
section 103 exceptions to refinance an existing facility and provide work-
ing capital to an entity already engaged in a trade or business at a
facility.56
The ruling recites that corporation , a nonexempt person, decided
to buy a facility from corporation , also nonexempt, with the borrowed
proceeds of a qualifying section 103(b) (4) offering. Although this is ac-
complished, corporation X is unable to move out, and instead rents and
occupies the facility for 120 days after the issuance. Corporation X
finally moves out when its new facility is completed. The general ques-
tion presented is whether corporation X, clearly a substantial user of the
facility before the issuance, has remained a substantial user after the
issuance (e.g., during the rental period). The resolution of this question
hinges on whether corporation X has violated a specific guideline of the
substantial user rules that prohibits the same entity from being a sub-
stantial user in both the five-year period before the issuance and the
five-year period after the issuance.
The ruling holds that corporation X, because of the temporary na-
ture of its occupation, is not a "substantial user" after the issuance.57
This ruling would make sense if the Service were a regulatory agency
permitted to waive rules in the face of hardship. The ruling, however,
when viewed from the perspective of a regulation that reasonably inter-
prets clear statutory language, appears misguided. Intent to move, or
temporariness of occupation, cannot turn a use that is clearly substantial
into one that is not.
Section 103 obviously subsidizes the issuance of qualifying state
and local obligations. The section thus is properly categorizable as a
subsidy that contains some intricate qualification rules. Revenue Rul-
ing 83-7 demonstrates that such a view of section 103 and, for that mat-
ter, the charitable and pension regimes, oversimplifies and distorts the
operation and application of those provisions. The Service's application
of the section 103 rules does not support notions that revenue considera-
tions or the accretion ideal remains preeminent or even central. In de-
ciding that corporation X was not a substantial user after the issuance of
bonds, the Service holds, in effect, that continued involuntary occupa-
tion of the facility is waivable in view of the "controlling" statutory ob-
jective, e.g., that the proceeds of the issuance be used for acquisition or
construction of a facility by a new user. As a result, the Service ignores
the rule that section 103, like all exemption and deduction provisions, is
55 Treas. Reg. § 1.103-8 (1980).




to be applied narrowly in light of the revenue-income theme. The only
explanation for the ruling is that the Service views itself as an agency
charged with protecting certain nonrevenue-raising regulatory
objectives.
D. Tax Expenditure Analysis
A description of the three major themes of the Code does not dis-
close a clear path for future action. Scholarly analysis generally has fo-
cused on the revenue-income and subsidization issues. A major
contribution of the tax expenditure school has been to ensure that any
kind of subsidization should be openly admitted and then to scrutinize
any such subsidy in light of two questions. The first question is whether
the loss of revenue from subsidization equals the social benefit received?
For example, the exclusion provided for interest earned on state and
local obligations is criticized because the revenue lost by the federal
treasury exceeds the interest savings to the state and local governments
in the case of some investors. 58 The second major question is whether
the tax benefits flow evenly among income groups? Although particular
tax benefits may be targeted at worthwhile nontaxation goals, this facet
of tax expenditure analysis demands consideration of the effect of the
benefits on horizontal equity. For example, the deduction provided for
mortgage interest 59 is attacked on a number of grounds. First, the
benefit flows to upper-income groups and property owners, but not to
renters. Second, the bigger one's mortgage, which is often related to the
size of both the house and the owner's income, the bigger the absolute
and relative benefits, assuming ascending tax brackets.
Tax expenditure analysis thus seeks to focus the subsidization ques-
tion by reference to the revenue-income theme. Tax expenditure analy-
sis fails, however, to explain adequately Congress's enactment of new
subsidies and retention of almost all of the old ones. The curtailment of
the casualty 6° and medical expense6 deductions in the 1982 Act and the
very complex tightening of the charitable contribution 62 deduction over
the years are among the few contrary examples. One of the successful
legislative control techniques, which tax expenditure analysis has pro-
duced, is the notion of placing time limits on new deductions. For ex-
58 Ifa taxable corporate bond of $1,000 face amount sells at par with a 12% coupon and
a tax exempt New York bond sells for 10%, it costs the United States at least $500 in lost
revenue in the case of a 50% taxpayer. New York, in turn, saves only $200, assuming that the
New York corporate bond is of similar quality. The subsidy cost thus exceeds the benefit to
New York by $300.
59 1 S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. McDANIEL & H. AULT, supra note 13, at 569-72.
I.R.C. § 163 grants the deduction.
60 I.R.C. § 165(c) (West Supp. 1983).
61 Id § 213.




ample, the residential energy credits6 3 and all saver certificate
provisions,r have expiration dates. Another improvement generated by
tax expenditure analysis has been the gradual effort to replace existing
deductions with tax credits that are rate bracket neutral.
65
Tax expenditure analysis also has been an inadequate tool for deal-
ing with the regulatory theme of the Code. To attack the charitable
contribution as a subsidy paid to rich people who make contributions to
elite-controlled charities, although perhaps true, is almost too funda-
mental a criticism. What would be done to control and regulate big
charities if their tax advantages were limited or curtailed? Would they
disappear? If they would, is it likely that Congress would let this hap-
pen? Tax expenditure analysis thus provides a fundamental criticism of
the pension and charitable schemes that is not terribly helpful.
Some commentators, 66 who focus on the revenue-income theme
rather than tax expenditure analysis, also have attacked both the chari-
table deduction and the pension tax benefits. One criticism is that as
soon as an employer gets a deduction for a pension plan contribution,
the beneficiary-employee, if identified and vested, should be in receipt of
income.67 A pension right is as clear an accretion to wealth as an in-
come-producing transfer to an employee of a noncoupon bond due on
the participant's sixty-fifth birthday.68
A problem with this criticism is its focus on the revenue aspect of
the Code in a context in which the Code's role is in large part regula-
tory. If Congress repealed the rule of nonincludability contained in sec-
tion 402 in furtherance of the accretion ideal, the regulatory provisions
would also be eliminated. Although the labor title of the 1974 Pension
Reform Act provides an available, alternative statutory scheme, 69
neither Congress nor many commentators have contemplated the cur-
tailment of the major tax benefits accorded to pension plans, their spon-
sors, and beneficiaries. This reluctance is attributable in part to the
superior skill of the Treasury Department in handling employee benefit
regulation as compared to the Labor Department.70
63 I.R.C. § 44C (Supp. V 1981 & West Supp. 1983) does not apply to expenditures made
after December 31, 1985.
64 All saver certificates must have been purchased before January 1, 1983. Id.
§ 128(c)(1)(A).
65 For instance, the old child care deduction has been changed into a credit along with
certain other alternatives. see, e.g., id. § 44A (1976, Supp. V 1981 & West Supp. 1983)
(old child care deduction is now a credit).
66 Blum, More on Twenty Questions, 42 TAXEs 180, 181 (1964).
67 This criticism is consistent with I.R.C. § 83(h) (1976 & West Supp. 1983) and
§ 404(a)(5) (1976).
68 Such a transfer would be income under id. § 83(a) (1976 & West Supp. 1983).
69 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
70 For political reasons, no major figure has ever stated this publicly. The statements by
Secretary Donovan to the Advisory Council on Employee Welfare and Benefit Plans on Feb-
ruary 17, 1982, that ERISA was on his Department's "front burner" and that it would get a
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Identification of the three major themes in the Code, revenue-in-
come, subsidization, and regulation, does not imply that they are recon-
cilable. The tax benefits accorded to qualified pension arrangements
may be inconsistent with the accretion ideal, yet their regulatory con-
tent is so significant that Congress tolerates the inconsistency. This re-
gime, and the two others, thus involve a trade-off, a trade-off which
cannot be explained solely in terms of subsidization. Although some
subsidies are administered in the Code for nontax reasons, simple subsi-
dies, such as the historic preservation benefits, are distinguishable from




Whether our income tax should accord savings greater immunity,
or whether it should be restructured to tax consumption and exempt
savings entirely have been the subjects of significant scholarly inquiry by
economists and tax commentators. 7 1 Economists and certain publicists
have pointed to what, until recently, appeared to be an abnormally low
rate of savings by United States citizens and residents.72 Some commen-
tators, led by Professor Andrews, have argued for a "cash-flow personal
income tax." This new regime would define income as receipts (exclud-
ing gratuitous transfers but including liquidated savings), less new sav-
ings, or alternatively, as consumption. 73 Andrews argues that such a tax
base would eliminate a number of the problems of the current system.
74
The consumption tax idea has not made much headway in the
United States, but the notion that the income tax penalizes savers or
savings has found a mass audience.75 Most discussion of this issue has
focused on the appropriate rate, holding period, and methodology for
"lot of action" show some appreciation of the unfavorable comparison. 5 PENS. PLAN GUIDE
(CCH) 25,432, at 27,011-18.
71 See articles cited in Bradford, supra note 16, at 243; see a/so N. KALDOR, AN EXPENDI-
TURE TAX 79-101 (1969); N. TURE & B. SANDEN, THE EFFECTS OF TAx POLICY ON CAPITAL
FORMATION 57-137 (1977).
72 N. TURE & B. SANDEN, supra note 71, at 38-43. The authors' own data ironically
show the rate of savings increasing steadily from 1948 to 1975. The authors also derive a
"shortage" from a projection of capital needed in the future, rather than from any proof of a
current shortage.
73 Andrews, A Consumption- Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113,
1120 (1974).
74 Id at 1128-48. Although, like others, I am not convinced by the purported adminis-
trative convenience inherent in Andrews's approach, see, e.g., Gunn, The Casefor an Income Tax,
46 U. CHI. L. REv. 370, 388-96 (1979); Minarik, The Future of the Individual Income Tar, 35
NAT'L TAX J. 231, 233-35 (1982), this article focuses on the theoretical underpinnings of the
decision not to tax net savings.
75 See, e.g., N. TURE & B. SANDEN, supra note 71, at 58-61.
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taxing gains and losses on capital assets.76 Congress in 1978 increased
the excluded portion of long-term capital gains to 60%77 in response to
the claim that the United States' income tax discouraged savings or in-
vestment. Several provisions in ERTA also reflect Congress's desire to
encourage savings and investment.
78
A. IRAs
The 1981 Act took an indirect step toward the consumption tax
idea79 in what appears to be an odd place. In 1974, as part of the Pen-
sion Reform Act, Congress had provided that individuals who were not
"active participants" in a qualified plan could establish and contribute
to an individual retirement account (IRA) the lesser of 15% or $1,500 a
year.80 Thus, an individual not currently participating in a private pen-
sion plan could create a modest retirement fund on his own. Once he
went to work for a private employer with a regular plan, however, he
could not contribute anything to his IRA on account of any year in
which he was an active participant in the employer's plan.81 The 1981
Act eliminated this active participation rule.
The 1981 Act cut IRAs loose from the larger regime for regulating
pensions in several other ways as well. For example, any employed per-
son may now establish and contribute the lesser of $2,000 or 100% of his
compensation to his IRA without regard to his participation in any
other tax-favored pension arrangement, except for another IRA or a
special IRA hybrid, the simplified employer plan.8 2 In addition, contri-
butions to the IRA do not count against the maximum contribution 83 or
targeted benefit limitations84 applicable in the case of an individual's
participation in regular tax-favored pension arrangements. A compre-
76 See, e.g., id. at 64-66; see also M. DAVID, ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO CAPITAL
GAINS TAXATION 116-44 (1968).
77 I.R.C. § 1202(a) (Supp. V 1981).
78 See infra notes 79-97 and accompanying text.
79 Professor Bradford agrees. Bradford, supra note 16, at 243. He argues that the trend
began with the 1978 Act after the defeat of President Carter's tax reform program that aimed
at equalizing taxation for all types of savings income. Id; see also Hickman, supra note 2, at
272-73.
80 The deduction was provided for in I.R.C. § 219 (1976). The vehicle, in three separate
forms, is defined by I.R.C. § 408 (1976, Supp. V 1981 & West Supp. 1983).
81 See Osgood, Qualif&d Pension and Profit-Sharing Plan Vesting: Revolution Not Reform, 59
B.U.L. REV. 452, 466 (1979) ("A critical IRA rule is that any level of participation in a quali-
fied pension or profit-sharing plan precludes IRA participation.") (emphasis in original)
(footnote 6mitted).
82 I.R.C. § 219(b) (Supp. V 1981). The Code counts "qualified voluntary employee
contributions" by an employee-participant to a qualified plan against the IRA contribution
limit. Id. § 219(b)(3)(B).
83 Id. § 415(c) (1976, Supp. V 1981 & West Supp. 1983). Excluding IRAs and
equivalents from the list of covered vehicles contained in id. § 415(a)(2) achieves this
result.
84 Id § 415(b) (1976 & West Supp. 1983).
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hensive set of rules establishes and regulates the limitations and aggre-
gates commonly controlled enterprises8 5 to the end that each individual
cannot accumulate unlimited sums in a tax-favored plan.
Congress deleted the active participation rule partly for a reason
"internal" to the pension rules of the Code; it operated harshly in the
case of a person whose unvested interest in a plan remained unvested
either because he had already terminated service or definitely intended
to do so.8 6 Such people could not establish and contribute to an IRA
even though their participation in the qualified plan was illusory. The
primary reason, however, for the change in the IRA rule was to further
savings. Indeed, the House Conference Report on the 1981 Act catego-
rized the IRA change in a portion of the report entitled "Savings Incen-
tives Provisions."8 7  Congress also grouped provisions for all saver
certificates88 and certain dividend reinvestment plans in the same sec-
tion of the Report.8 9
B. All Saver Certificates
The 1981 Act exempted from taxation up to $1,000 per person of
interest income earned on certain certificates ("all saver certificates")
issued by savings banks and other depository institutions before January
1, 1983.90 The tax benefit provided is a permanent forgiveness of the
$1,000 of income and is thus unlike the IRA deduction, which defers
recognition until an actual or deemed distribution.9'
Section 128(d)(1) requires institutions issuing such certificates to
maintain certain levels of investments in "qualified residential financ-
ing." Congress had thus hoped that all saver certificates would stabilize
savings-industry institutions and at the same time provide more funds
for housing.92 This brief experiment probably will end after 1983 be-
cause it has failed to generate sufficient new deposits.
93
85 Id § 414(b)-(c) (Supp. V 1981).
86 See, e.g., Orzechowski v. Commissioner, 592 F.2d 677, 678 (2d Cir. 1979) (contribution
to an IRA by an "active participant" in employer's qualified pension plan made after learn-
ing of imminent discharge from that employment disallowed as deduction).
87 See H.R. REP. No. 215, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 195, 239-44, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 285, 327-32 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT].
88 I.R.C. § 128 (Supp. V 1981).
89 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 87, at 239-46, reptznted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 327-34.
90 The exemption was for $1,000 per person over the life of the program, not for each
year. I.R.C. § 128(b)(1) (Supp. V 1981). Each spouse was deemed to receive one half of any
interest income on an all saver certificate and reported on a joint return. Id. § 128(b)(2).
91 Id. § 408(d) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (actual distributions), (e)(2)(B), (e)(4) (1976)
(deemed distributions).
92 HousE REPORT, supra note 87, at 243-44, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 285, 332.
93 N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 1982, at Dl, col. 1. On its expiration a new I.R.C. § 128 will
spring up which will exclude up to $3,000 of interest income per individual in any year.
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C. Qualified Reinvested Dividend Plans
The 1981 Act also defers recognition of up to $750 of dividends, per
individual, if reinvested in newly issued common stock of certain public
utilities. This provision, which is scheduled to expire on December 31,
1985, 94 reflects Congress's fear that the amount of capital available in
nondebt form is insufficient to ensure the stability of these utilities.95
The plan provides only a partial forgiveness for reinvested dividend in-
come. Section 305(e)(7)(A) assigns the newly acquired stock a zero ba-
sis, and there is no adjustment of the utility's earnings and profits
account. 96 Section 305(e)(7)(B) taxes any gain on a sale after one year




SAVINGS AND INCOME TAXATION
Congress presented the changes in IRA eligibility, all saver certifi-
cates, and reinvested utility dividend plans as a means to encourage sav-
ings.98 Several commentators nonetheless view them as an experiment
with the consumption tax.99 I will evaluate this experiment by consider-
ing the three provisions in light of the three themes of income taxation
developed in the first part of this article.
A. Revenue-Income
Professor Andrews has pointed out that although the present in-
come tax is based on the accretion ideal, it strays quite far from that
ideal in a number of important respects related to savings. t° For exam-
ple, appreciation in a capital asset held throughout a given tax year goes
unrecognized. 10 1 This is the case even where such appreciation may
represent immediate enrichment available to the owner in the form of
loan collateral and is still unrecognized. Conversely, if the asset yields
interest, dividends, or rent, the owner is to that extent in receipt of
income.
The income tax's present ideology thus is not internally consistent.
In concluding that the present tax resembles to a significant degree a
consumption tax, Professor Andrews relies mainly on its failure to tax
94 I.R.C. § 305(e)(12) (Supp. V 1981).
95 HoUSE REPORT, supra note 87, at. 245-46, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWs 285, 334.
96 I.R.C. § 305(e)(7)(A) (Supp. V 1981) (basis); HOUSE REPORT, supra note 87, at 245-
46, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 285, 334 (earnings and profits).
97 I.R.C. § 305(e)(7)(B) (Supp. V 1981).
98 See supra text accompanying note 87.
99 See supra text accompanying note 79.
100 Andrews, supra note 73, at 1117.
101 Id at 1118-20.
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unrealized capital asset appreciation and contributions to qualified pen-
sion and other deferred compensation arrangements. 10 2 Andrews does
not stop with this observation but goes on to argue for a consumption
tax. Unlike Nicholas Kaldor,10 3 Andrews does not take issue with the
notion that it is "income" which should be taxed.10 4 Nor does he disa-
gree that income should be taxed because it is a major indicium of
wealth and thus an appropriate target of annual taxation. 105
Administrative considerations aside, Andrews makes three argu-
ments for a consumption tax. First, because savings merely represent
deferred consumption, the present rules, which tax both earnings and the
income yield on savings, place a heavier burden on deferred consump-
tion than on present consumption, and thus a heavier burden on sav-
ings.10 6 His position here mirrors John Stuart Mill's double taxation on
savings argument. 107 Andrews indicates that an ideal income tax should
make a taxpayer indifferent as between current or deferred consump-
tion, putting aside all nontax considerations. A consumption tax thus
recognizes income based on lifetime consumption without distorting in-
dividual preferences as to the timing of consumption. Second, Andrews
argues that exempting savings from current taxation is merely a timing
decision.'08 Third, although taxing wealth may be desirable for political
or other reasons, an income tax, even a pure accretion-type tax, is at best
an indirect way of taxing wealth. ' 0 9 Directly taxing wealth by an acces-
sions tax or a strengthened estate and gift tax system would be
preferable. 110
In a thoughtful comment," 1 Professor Warren has challenged An-
drews's justifications for selecting a consumption tax. Warren agrees
that the obvious effect of the accretion ideal is the curtailment of future
consumption by taxing it at the point of saving and again when income
on the saved amounts is recognized. 12 Warren argues, however, that in
102 Id at 1117.
103 N. KALDOR, supra note 71, at 24-25.
104 Andrews, supra note 73, at 1119-20.
105 Id at 1169.
106 Id at 1167. Charles McLure, Jr. recently noted the discontinuity between Andrews's
terms and framework and most economic thinking. Not all savings represents deferred con-
sumption. Yet, in describing the advantages of a consumption tax, that identity is assumed
and is crucial. See McClure, Taxes, Saovigs and Welfare: Theogy and Evidence, 33 NAT'L TAx J.
311, 318 (1980).
107 J.S. MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICA. ECONOMY bk. V, ch. II, § 3, at 806-10 (W.J.
Ashley ed. 1965).
108 Andrews, supra note 73, at 1120.
109 Andrews, Fairness and the Personal Income Tax." A Reply to Professor Warren, 88 HARV. L.
REv. 947, 956-58 (1975).
110 See, e.g., Andrews, The Accessions Tax Proposal, 22 TAx L. REv. 589 (1967).
111 Warren, Comment.: Fairness and a Consumption- Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 88
HARv. L. REV. 931 (1975).
112 Id at 932-34.
[Vol. 68:521
SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT
defining fairness by reference to a characteristic of a consumption tax,
Andrews has failed to make a principled argument against the accretion
ideal. Warren also challenges Andrews on the substantiality of the ef-
fect, 113 by arguing that curtailing savings, and hence future consump-
tion, presumptively forces interest rates higher over the long run; the
effect of the heavier tax burden thus is moderated by the more generous
rewards it generates on savings.
Revenue-income considerations suggest reasons why an income tax
should not distinguish between a use of current income for savings ver-
sus consumption. First, an income tax is premised on the notion that
those with greater incomes should pay more tax in absolute dollar terms.
This conclusion is not derived from economic analysis but moral philos-
ophy. As wealth increases, it is just for the absolute' 4 level of taxation
to increase as well.
Two major justifications for increasing individual taxation as
wealth increases have been made. First, individuals with greater wealth
derive greater public benefits (e.g., more peace and protection) than
people with less wealth. It therefore is appropriate to tax them more
heavily." 5 The consensus among modem commentators, however, is
that there is no proportional relationship between wealth and social
benefits."
6
A second justification proceeds from several assumptions. Each in-
cremental dollar above a subsistence level of income has (taking into
account all individuals in a society) less value or utility to the recipient
than the preceding dollar." 7 Value or utility is defined as happiness or
satisfaction. A society may determine public needs to be paid for by
taxes and also may exempt from taxation individuals living below a sub-
sistence level.' 18 Those who earn income above a subsistence level
should contribute more in absolute terms as their incomes increase and
perhaps even more in proportional terms because doing so deprives
them of less utility than a flat tax would, such as one based on
citizenship." ,9
113 Id at 934-41.
114 "Absolute" means the total dollars, not percentages. It does not necessarily follow,
nor is there any consensus, that taxation should increase more than proportionally. See, e.g.,
J.S. MILL, supra note 107, bk. V, ch. II, at 802-22.
115 See, e.g., W. KLEIN, POLICY ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAx 2-8 (1976).
116 See, e.g., J.S. MILL, supra note 107, bk. V, ch. II, § 2, at 804.
117 See P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 433-35 (10th ed. 1976).
118 J.S. MILL, supra note 107, bk. V, ch. III, § 5, at 829. Jeremy Bentham wrote two
essays explicitly concerned with taxation, one attacking "law-taxes" (e.g., legal filing fees),
and the other endorsing a wider ambit for death escheats of wealth. In his article on law
taxes, Bentham attacked "law-taxes" because they are not taxes on "affluence" which, ac-
cording to Bentham, is what all taxes should be. 2 J. BENTHAM, WORKS 573 (J. Bowring ed.
1843). He also condemned consumption taxes that fall on necessities such as justice or bread.
Id
119 These two views represent those who defend a proportional income tax, and those
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Because both of these arguments are premised on an assessment of
utility or benefit from an individual perspective, they may ignore, to
some extent, aggregate social utility. For instance, if it could be shown
that saving is necessary for the long-term health of society and that sav-
ing is done primarily by wealthy individuals with their last dollars of
income, a society may need to weigh this nonindividual utility factor in
designing its fiscal system.
120
The two theories differ in one subterranean aspect. Adherents of
the second theory imply that wealth comes haphazardly to people. 21
Some people do not "earn" it in a tough-minded sense. Rather, they
inherit it or do something fortuitous such as invest in Xerox at an oppor-
tune moment. Few individuals work and save their way to wealth com-
pletely unaided by luck or happenstance. Taking away their wealth,
thus, far from being a brutal seizure, is merely an effort to re-award
some portion of wealth according to a socially acceptable mechanism. 122
According to both schools of thought, income is a major form of
wealth. Income taxation thus is initially justifiable as a tax on
wealth. 123 But as Andrews and others have pointed out, it is an indirect
tax on wealth, 2 4 taxing directly current command over income without
regard to use or application.
A justification of the income tax on the ground that it reaches a
primary form of wealth does not explain its inconsistencies. The tradi-
tional explanation for the distinction between the treatment of unreal-
ized capital appreciation and wages is that the income tax focuses
consciously and unconsciously on the notion that income must be "de-
rived"; there must be a severance, most commonly in the form of a dis-
position. 125 The notion that a taxpayer must have changed his position
to justify imposing a tax derogates from the accretion ideal. The ease,
however, of tax collection upon such a severance supports this deroga-
who defend a progressive income tax. Compare, e.g., Gunn, supra note 74, at 378-88 (propor-
tional income tax) with W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE
INCOME TAxATION (2d ed. 1963) (progressive income tax).
120 Mill favored exempting savings from income taxation, but also favored higher rates of
taxation on passive investment income than on active business income. J.S. MILL, supra note
107, bk. V, ch. II, at 802-22.
121 Professor Gunn has formulated a variation of this argument. Gunn argues that
wealth taxation is less desirable than income taxation because individuals have a "stronger
social claim" to their property than to their current year's income. Gunn, supra note 74, at
381. Although I may disagree with this proposition, Gunn is correct in noting that a wealth
tax would be more socially disruptive than an income tax.
122 J.S. MILL, sura note 107, bk. V, chs. I & II, §§ 1-2, at 795-805.
123 This final step is frequently taken by circular reasoning that disguises this conclusion
in the formulation of a "fairness methodology." According to this view, an income tax is
defensible because it is based on "ability to pay." See Gunn, supra note 74, at 386-88.
Wealthy people with no income, of course, are able to pay but are not taxed.
124 Andrews, supra note 109, at 956-58.
125 1 S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. McDANIEL & H. AULT, supra note 13, at 923-36.
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tion from the accretion ideal.1 26 The difficulty in valuing an asset, to-
gether with its annual appreciation, apart from an actual sale or
disposition, further justifies the distinction between unrealized capital
appreciation and wages.'
27
Andrews's second major example of the current system's 128 depar-
ture from the accretion ideal cannot be explained by reference to such
practical considerations. Money in the form of a pension contribution,
or income on an invested contribution, is taxable. Deferral of taxation
on pension contributions, however, may be explained by the dichotomy
in the present income tax between the personal and business-investor
regimes discussed earlier. 129 The special pension provisions may be in-
terpreted, within the limits prescribed by the Code, as an additional
personal exemption. 130 Under this view, retirement savings are outside
the accretion concept until distributed because of the economic necessity
of such savings. Through the pension system, the income tax may be
providing an offset for the necessary provision of taxable post-retirement
income. This is similar to the current $1,000 personal exemption which
has the effect of treating as disposable only income above that level.
In sum, if the income tax aims to tax wealth, the removal of net
savings from the concept of income would be a major change. Because
savings and investment increase an individual's wealth, the use of in-
come for savings rather than constituting a basis for deferring taxation,
supports the decision to tax.131 Andrews counters that the failure to tax
income that is saved or invested is nothing more than a delay or defer-
ral, not a forgiveness; in the same article, 132 however, he describes the
126 Although the taxpayer does not receive cash in an exchange of properties, such an
exchange still may constitute a realization under I.R.C. § 1001. Such exchanges are relatively
infrequent and special rules such as I.R.C. § 1031 accord certain exchanges nonrecognition
treatment.
127 M. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 71 (3d ed. 1982).
128 Andrews, supra note 73, at 1115.
129 See supra text accompanying notes 12-14.
130 This argument focuses on the participants and ignores the benefits that accrue to the
employer as a result of current deductibility under I.R.C. § 402, and the trust exemption of
I.R.C. § 501(a). Section 83 would provide a deduction to the employer if the benefits are
vested and, therefore, it is not clear that the I.R.C. § 404(a) deduction is a benefit to an
employer. I.R.C. § 83(h) (1976). To the extent that exempted trust income, under I.R.C.
§ 501 (a), accrues to the participants, it benefits them, not the employer, and, therefore, is not
a benefit to the employer.
131 A recent article by Geoffrey Brennan and David Nellor attempts to weigh the "extra"
or "psychic" benefits of wealth and accumulation-in the form of savings as opposed to con-
sumption. Many people who reject the consumption tax have asserted that these benefits
invalidate the present versus future consumption-neutrality argument used by consumption
tax proponents. Brennan and Nellor conclude that if such psychic benefits exist and are
quantifiable, then neither a "pure" income tax nor a consumption tax is "neutral." Accord-
ing to this view, only a labor income tax is neutral. Brennan & Nellor, Wealth, Consumption and
Tax Neutrality, 35 NAT'L TAX.J. 427, 435 (1982).
132 Andrews, supra note 73, at 1123-28.
1983]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:521
special benefits of deferral.
A second major reason why an income tax should not differentiate
between savings and consumption is macroeconomic. At various times,
savings may be more or less desirable from a national economic perspec-
tive.' 33 In the depths of a depression saving is less desirable than extra
consumption, 34 yet at such moments people may be afraid to spend for
fear of impoverishment. Conversely, in the hysteria of an inflationary
spiral, consumption appears more attractive than savings because com-
modities, including inventory, look as if they will hold their worth better
than money saved. 135 Market economics, however, do affect the eco-
nomic and pyschological components of the decision to save or con-
sume.136 As a depression deepens, rates of return on savings fall and
consumption becomes increasingly attractive. At an inflationary apo-
gee, interest rates should rise to the point that investors will be en-
couraged to save rather than consume.
The attractiveness of savings and consumption thus depends on the
cyclical position of an economy. The tax system in a mixed economy 37
in which cyclical business performance is considered to be endemic
should remain neutral toward savings and consumption in order to
maximize efficiency.
The consumption tax is flawed because even if it is neutral as be-
tween present and future consumption over a lifetime or lifetimes, as
133 See, e.g., P. SAMUELSON, supra note 117, at 237-38.
134 Allsopp, The International Demand Management Problem, in THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM IN
THE U.K. 415 (D. Norris ed. 1979).
135 See, e.g., P. SAMUELSON, supra note 117, at 273.
136 Commentators argue that the existence and amount of individual savings varies with
income. The poorest individuals typically "dissave" whereas the wealthiest save the most. See
P. SAMUELSON, supra note 117, at 209, fig. 11-1; S. KuzN;rs, SHARES OF UPPER INCOME
GROUPS IN INCOME AND SAVINGS 225, table 58 (1953). Professor Kuznets's study on savings
and income concludes that although the savings of upper income groups is reasonably stable
throughout business cycles, the savings patterns of lower income groups are volatile and tend
to increase during prosperous periods and disappear in times of economic contraction.
Kuznets's findings do not necessarily contradict the thesis that the best form of taxation in a
mixed economy that experiences cyclical business performance is a tax that does not distin-
guish between savings and consumption. See infra text accompanying note 137. Because the
savings of the top tenth of income-earnings units typically produces about three-quarters of
all savings, its relative stability when income decreases may be reflected as a relative increase
in the rate of savings.
It is troublesome that both Kaldor's and Kuznets's data come from odd periods, immedi-
ate post-war Britain and depression-era United States, respectively. A long-term study of
savings data is needed.
137 See general.y D. CREAMER, PERSONAL INCOME DURING BUSINESS CYCLES (1956).
Federal Reserve Bank data for the 1982 recession, which appears to have ended, indicate
that the rate of savings went up dramatically during the recession but fell in the early post-
recession months to its 1980 pre-recession level. This occurred in the face of the IRA liberali-
zation and other tax changes made in the 1981 Act with the avowed intention of increasing
savings and investment. See Where Have All the Savings Gone?, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1983, at
A18, col. 1.
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Andrews asserts, it is not neutral at the moment of decision. 38 A con-
sumption tax inexorably favors savings at all points in time more than
the present tax system because people make decisions regarding savings
and consumption based in part on the immediate consequences of their
decision. People do not think solely in terms of a lifetime flow of con-
sumptions. It is also not clear how people relate deferred consumption
needs to savings. 139 Existing data suggest that saving is a function of
many factors; patterns of behavior embedded in a culture, and a mix of
nonconsumption motives, such as a desire to build a patrimony or a
particular power base and future consumption needs, all affect the deci-
sion to save.14°
A third reason for favoring an income tax that does not distinguish
between savings and consumption is that the two are not easily distin-
guishable. Their relationship is so complex and poorly understood that
major consequences in a tax system should not flow from making a
sharp distinction between the two.141 Higher consumption requires
greater investment at some point. If people buy automobiles rather
than save, the automobile industry's rate of return rises and the return
on investment increases whether by reinvestment of earnings or new
capital issuance.
The liberalized IRA deduction illustrates how the consumption
ideal would operate. The following chart demonstrates the value of a
decision not to tax saved income. The left column reflects the two major
IRA benefits: a current deduction for $1,000 and an exemption of the
account's income (at 10%) for six years based on a single $1,000 contri-
bution. The right column shows a similarly situated taxpayer who de-
posits $1,000, less taxes, into a savings account with the subsequent
account interest also diminished by appropriate taxes. Assume the tax-
payer pays taxes at a uniform 50% rate.
138 Joseph Minarik has called an expenditure tax "nearly procyclical." Minarik, The Fu-
ture of the Individual Income Tax, 35 NAT'L TAX J. 231, 232 (1982).
139 See Menchik & David, The Incidence of a Lifetime Consumption Tax, 35 NAT'L TAX J. 189
(1982) (consumption tax will distort individual decisions about when to save because of pri-
macy of "bequest" planning in such decisions).
140 See Howrey & Hymans, The Measurement and Determination of Loanable Funds Saving, 3
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIc Acrvrry 655-85 (1978). But see Boskin, Taxation, Saving,
and the Rate of Interest, 86 J. POL. ECON. S3 (1978).
141 The complexity and circularity of present economic theory on this subject is demon-
strated in chapters 11 through 13 of Professor Samuelson's current textbook. P. SAMUELSON,





(i) Year of Contribution
(Assume made on 12/31/82) $1,000 $500
(ii) End of Yr. 1 - 12/31/83 100 25
(iii) End of Yr. 2 - 12/31/84 110 26.25
(iv) End of Yr. 3 - 12/31/85 121 27.5
(v) End of Yr. 4 - 12/31/86 133.1 28.9
(vi) End of Yr. 5 - 12/31/87 146.4 30.4
(vii) End of Yr. 6 - 12/31/88 161 31.9
If the IRA participant receives a distribution at the end of year six of the
amount in the account, he must pay the United States about $885.75,
and retains $885.75. If the regular saver withdraws the amount in his
account, he receives $670.05. The magnifying effect of a double tax ex-
emption, which Andrews has noted, 142 leaves the beneficiary of the tax
exemption substantially (32%) better off. Exempting savings until di-
vestment thus increases the amount of money available at that time,
assuming constant rates of taxation.
Several comments on the assumptions embedded in the chart are in
order. First, some savings, such as pension savings, may be predicated
on a decline in the tax rates over an individual's lifetime. Second, be-
cause of the price effect, the adoption of a consumption tax might in-
crease the stock of savings and reduce over time the rate of return that
would prevail under a nonconsumption tax.143 Neither of these observa-
tions constitutes an argument for a consumption tax. If income tax rates
decline, those who save will have more money available. If the rate of
return on saving decreases as a result of the adoption of a consumption
tax, the comparison made in the foregoing chart would remain valid,
but the growth in each case would be appropriately diminished.
The revenue-income theme, informed by the accretion ideal, thus is
inconsistent with a deduction from income for savings, as exemplified by
the new IRA deduction. This conclusion extends to the new provisions
for dividend reinvestment plans and all saver certificates. The complete
forgiveness provided by the former and partial forgiveness by the latter
cannot be reconciled with a consumption tax. They can be justified, if
at all, only as subsidies.
B. Subsidization
Congress frequently uses the income tax to subsidize taxpayers who
142 Andrews, supra note 73, at 1121.
143 Andrews does not challenge this, but questions the magnitude of the price effect. An-
drews, supra note 73, at 1173. Strictly speaking, if projections of future consumption needs
hold constant, and that is the sole determinant of saving, and if the United States were to
adopt a consumption tax, the rate of saving should drop.
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engage in favored activities. The liberalized IRA deduction and the
provisions for reinvested utility dividends and all saver certificates seem
to be a crude effort to encourage saving through subsidization. The
IRA deduction is a flawed subsidy because this form of savings is dispro-
portionately utilized by wealthy taxpayers. 44 From a tax expenditure
perspective, the IRA deduction constitutes a matching grant to en-
courage savings among a group of taxpayers whose annual family in-
comes are well above average. Qualified dividend reinvestment plans
provide a subsidy that goes to an even wealthier group of taxpayers:
those who own common stock. 145 Finally, all saver certificates require
an investment of about $10,000146 to obtain the full, $1,000 individual
exclusion in a single year. In addition, by fixing the certificate rate at
70% of the average Treasury Bill rate at the next preceding auction, the
program only benefits taxpayers in higher income tax brackets.
I47
The benefit gained under these three provisions, a potential in-
crease in national savings, has a cost calculable in terms of horizontal
tax equity. Because wealthy individuals would be the primary benefi-
ciaries of all three of these provisions, the most noticeable effect, given
their modest dimensions, may be to make the rich a bit richer rather
than to augment materially national savings.
C. Regulation
The liberalized IRA deduction, qualified dividend reinvestment
plans, and all saver certificates are inconsistent with the accretion ideal
because they exclude some income from both immediate and eventual
taxation. Furthermore, any subsidies these provisions supply, diminish
horizontal tax equity. Although these provisions cannot be justified on
the basis of the revenue-income or subsidization themes of the Code,
they may be justifiable as regulatory measures.
Perhaps the liberalized IRA can be viewed as part of the elaborate
Code system for regulating pensions. Although in operation sections 219
and 404 provide deductions that accrue to the benefit of the wealthy,
Congress may feel that such inequity is tolerable in order to provide
reasonable private pensions for certain employed individuals as a sup-
144 For the calendar year 1979, 51% of all IRA deductions in dollar terms went to tax-
paying units whose income was $30,000 or more. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS
OF INCOME: 1979 INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAx RETURNS 4, 22 (1982).
145 For the calendar year 1979, 68% of all dividend income was reported on returns with
an adjusted gross income of $30,000 or more; only 12% of the returns filed by individuals had
adjusted gross income of $30,000 or more. Id at 15.
146 If an individual applied $10,000 toward the purchase of a 10% all saver certificate, the
$1,000 exclusion would have been consumed in a single year.
147 If the Treasury Bill rate were 10% and the all saver rate 7%, a 50% bracket taxpayer
would gain $20 a year ($100 income less $50 tax versus $70 of income) by investing in a
$1,000 all saver certificate. A 25% bracket taxpayer would lose $5 ($100 income less $25 tax
versus $70 of income).
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plement to social security. Thus, Congress may have concluded that the
provision of private pensions through the Code's many regulatory pen-
sion rules justifies an exception to the accretion ideal.
The problem with the foregoing argument is that IRAs are now
clearly outside the pension regime. If Congress had dropped the active
participation rule of section 219, but still included the IRA contribu-
tions in the benefit limit rules of section 415, IRAs arguably would have
remained part of the pension regime.
1 48
Inability to fit the liberalized IRA deduction into the pension re-
gime does not mean that this provision is not part of a larger regulatory
effort by Congress. IRA liberalization, all saver certificates, and quali-
fied dividend reinvestment plans may constitute the first steps in the
creation of another Code regulatory regime, a regime that provides tax
benefits for those investments which Congress feels are desirable as part
of a new government effort to control and assist business. Alternatively,
these steps may be directed toward the creation of a fourth major theme
in the tax law.
1. A Tax-Based National Enterprise Poli 149
This effort to aid business has analogues in Britain, France, and
Sweden, 50 where national governments of both rightist and leftist par-
ties have attempted to devise methods of channeling savings into certain
enterprises thought to be short of capital. In Britain, the National En-
terprise Board, created in 1975, invested general revenues in business
enterprises. 5 1 In Sweden, the newly elected socialist government has
advocated using revenues from payroll and excess-profit taxes to finance
148 One could argue that IRA plans are still within the benefit-limit rules and that their
noninclusion merely constitutes a $2,000 addition to those limits. This argument, however,
fails to explain the other extraordinary aspects of IRAs. For example, an owner of a business
may establish an IRA, contribute up to his limit, and then do nothing for his employees.
149 I will refer to this developing regime or theme as a nascent "national enterprise
policy."
150 It also has nontax analogues in this country in the Lockheed and Chrysler bail outs.
See Chrysler Loan Guarantee Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-185, 93 Stat. 1324 (1980).
151 Morris, Industrial Poliqy, in THE EcONOMIC SYSTEM IN THE U.K. 523-45 (2d ed.
1979). The National Enterprise Board was created by the Industry Act, 1975, ch. 68, which
also had as a goal the preservation of British ownership of certain industries.
A national enterprise policy can raise significant intra-industry equity questions. In
1976, the British Secretary of State issued guidelines designed to ensure that the Board would
not favor companies in which the Board had an investment, over other companies in the same
industry in which the Board had no stake. See id In Booth & Co. v. National Enter. Bd.,
[1978] 3 All E.R. 624, a group of non-Board controlled tanning companies, all of which were
profitable, brought an action against the Board charging that the Board's investment in an
unprofitable tanning company violated the 1976 guidelines. See genraly Sharpe, Unfair Com-
petition by Public Support of Aivate Enterprires, 95 LAw Q. REv. 205 (1979).
An article in the London Times of Feb. 27, 1983, at 57, col. 1, noted that the Thatcher
government wishes to remove from the Board, renamed the British Technology Group, the
power to acquire equity interests in private enterprises.
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entities that will gradually acquire Swedish enterprises and provide in-
vestment funds. 152 In France, 53 the government recently used consider-
able sums of public funds to purchase certain industries and businesses.
A national enterprise policy, as the term is used here, is one
whereby the government in a mixed economy undertakes to provide
capital to industries. Capital can be provided to industries generally or
can be targeted to specific industries which are failing but whose longer
term survival is thought desirable, or which are promising but unable to
raise sufficient capital. In Sweden and France, the policy has an obvious
socialist political cast, but the governments of those countries as well as
Britain's also justify it as responsive to failures in the capital markets.
Support for national enterprise policies in France, Sweden, and
Britain does not necessarily indicate that such a policy will be forthcom-
ing in the United States. On the other hand, if the same basic causes
that produced such a phenomenon in those countries are present in the
United States, what happened there may be suggestive of the future
here.
No one is sure why these countries have moved toward a national
enterprise policy. Even Prime Minister Thatcher's conservative govern-
ment, dominated by free market economic ministers, has been unable to
halt the development of a national enterprise policy. Table I154 suggests
an explanation for this trend and indicates why a national enterprise
policy, whether tax-based or otherwise, probably will come to the
United States. Since 1955, total tax receipts as a percentage of gross
domestic product have risen in each of the nations listed in the table. In
particular, the level of aggregate taxation in 1980 was approximately
fifty percent in Sweden and thirty percent in the United States.
TABLE I
TOTAL TAX RECEIPTS AS PERCENTAGE OF GROSS
DOMESTIC PRODUCT AT MARKET PRICES
1955 1965 1975 1979 1980
Sweden 22.5 35.6 44.2 49.9
United Kingdom 29.8 30.8 36.9 35.9
United States 23.6 26.5 30.2 30.7
France 35.0 41.2
Taxation preempts both consumption and savings thus decreasing
private funds available for investment. If government taxes or borrows
a substantial portion of national income, the private funds available for
152 N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1982, at A3, col. 1.
153 Borde & Eggleston, The French Nationaizations, 68 A.B.A. J. 422 (1982).
154 Table I is compiled from data taken from LONG-TERM TRENDS IN TAX REVENUES
OF OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES 1955-1980 (1981) (OECD Studies in Taxation).
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investment may prove inadequate. The government may be forced to
use a portion of its tax revenue as an investment subsidy to compensate
for the funds which otherwise would be invested by the private sector.
Reducing high rates of taxation in a country such as Sweden with its
fifty percent tax rate would increase private investment and presumably
eliminate or at least ameliorate the problem. But no economist or politi-
cian is predicting that the rates of taxation will decrease substantially in
the major mixed-economy nations. Table I suggests that unless some-
thing significant occurs, the public sector will take increasing portions of
national income. To the extent investment is desirable, it may have to
be government investment or investment subsidized by tax exemption.
This analysis does not support the argument for a consumption tax.
My basic premise is that government expenditure in the Western de-
mocracies may now be so high that it significantly curtails both con-
sumption and savings. Congress may be forced to subsidize investment
and savings, not because it is preferable to consumption, but because
most of what government hands back to its citizens by way of benefits
represents either transfer payments or consumption-type items, such as
national parks or national defense. To balance the ledger, public busi-
ness investment activity, or tax subsidization of analogous private activ-
ity, may be necessary. But Congress should undertake such activity or
subsidization only after the kind of scrutiny given the three 1981 Act
changes above, and only if they have the counter cyclical capacity of
normal fiscal policy.
2. Other 1981 and 1982 Act Provisions
Other ERTA provisions, besides those already discussed concerning
IRA liberalization, all saver certificates, and qualified dividend reinvest-
ment plans, indicate that Congress may be beginning to channel savings
to industry in furtherance of a national enterprise policy. A new rule 155
provides that an investment of IRA funds in a collectible, such as
stamps, jewelry, gold, rugs, and similar nonproductive investments, con-
stitutes a distribution of the amount invested. The linkage of IRA liber-
alization within ERTA to provisions that reflect upon the desirability of
the underlying investment in social terms 5 6 is revealing.
Three unrelated changes made in the 1982 Act also support the
argument that Congress is not moving toward the consumption tax
model, but rather toward a tax-directed national enterprise policy.
First, the 1982 Act imposed on interest and dividends, except in certain
hardship cases, a ten percent withholding tax at source if the withhold-
ings will exceed $150 a year for any individual payee of any payor.157
155 I.R.C. § 408(m) (West Supp. 1983).
156 This has not been done in the qualified plan rules.
157 I.R.C. §§ 3451, 3452 (West Supp. 1983). David Bradford thought that Congress
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Although domestic-source interest and dividends received by nonresi-
dent aliens were subject to withholding prior to the 1982 Act, 158 critics
have interpreted the new withholding provisions as a swipe at domestic
investors.t59
The ten percent withholding requirement is more of a fiscal protec-
tion measure than a statement of policy on the savings issue. The Treas-
ury is convinced that significant quantities of interest and dividends are
not being reported as income. 60 It is also convinced that available com-
pliance resources never will lead to adequate policing of such income
reporting. Some modest level of withholding therefore is necessary to
encourage reporting or to collect at least some of the tax. For those with
higher incomes currently filing declarations of estimated tax, which ac-
curately reflect such interest and dividends, the declaration will merely
have to be revised downward. The new withholding requirements, ad-
ded by the 1982 Act for pensions and other deferred income, 161 are simi-
larly explainable.
Second, the tightening up of the treatment of original issue dis-
count bonds suggests that Congress is interested in encouraging national
investment, not savings.162 Before the 1982 Act, original issue discount
bonds, had generated enormous investor interest because of certain lacu-
nae in the Code. 163 The 1982 Act changes the methodology' 4 for tax-
ing the accruing (but unpaid) ordinary income interest portion of such
bonds in order to reflect accurately the way in which interest com-
pounds. The old rule required ratable accruals of the interest portion,
which allowed investors to sell such bonds and convert the com-
pounding benefit, derived by operation of the market value of the bond,
into capital gain. 65 This effort to harmonize the treatment of all types
of bonds appears inconsistent with the movement to the consumption
tax ideal. The reason for the change in original issue discount rules sup-
ports the notion that Congress is developing a national enterprise policy.
This change is part of the effort to prevent anomalies in the tax treat-
ment of investors in original issue discount or stripped bonds 66 and issu-
ers of discount bonds. Far from being antisavings, the Code now
would go the other way on this issue. Bradford, supra note 16, at 243. And, of course, events
occuring as this article goes to press may lead to a reversal of this new withholding.
158 I.R.C. § 1441 (1976).
159 This has, in turn, led to a call for repeal. Ithaca J., Jan. 21, 1983, at 1, col. 2.
160 S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 228-29 (1982).
161 I.R.C. §§ 3402(o), 3405, 6047(e), 6704 (West Supp. 1983).
162 Id. §§ 1232, 1232A.
163 See Nave, The Impact of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 on the Treatment
of Zero Coupon Bonds, 60 TAxEs 763 (1982); Walter, Tax Aspects of Recent Innovative Financings-
Strategies for Existing Discount Debt and for New Securities, 60 TAXEs 995 (1982):
164 I.R.C. § 1232A(a) (West Supp. 1983).
165 Nave, supra note 163, at 764.
166 I.R.C. § 1232B (West Supp. 1983).
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endeavors to treat discount bonds like similar investment vehicles, in
particular, coupon bonds. This undertaking can never achieve perfect
equality because of the difficulty of accounting separately for market
fluctuations in the bond, in the context of a sale, which represent inter-
est rate changes. But new section 1232A at least attempts to generate an
accurate cost basis before considering market effects.
The third change made by the 1982 Act, which may further a na-
tional enterprise policy, is the curtailment of the contribution 167 and
benefit 168 limits of section 415. These limits control the amount that a
taxpayer can set aside in any of the tax-favored plans. Congress also
harmonized Keogh plans with regular corporate plans, 169 and subjected
both sets of plans to new "top-heaviness" rules. 170 A plan that provides
sixty percent of its benefits to "key employees," is called top-heavy and
must adopt and apply various top-heaviness rules; accrued benefits or
accounts in such plans must vest participants faster and the plan must
provide minimum benefits.
Both the benefit-limit curtailment and top-heaviness rules reflect
enduring themes in the pension area. Qualified plans, which obtain the
triple171 tax benefits of qualification, should not be devices whereby
highly paid employees can accumulate vast amounts of tax exempt capi-
tal. Unless such plans spread benefits across some reasonable cross sec-
tion of employees, they are not justifiable. Because Congress need not
move consistently on all fronts, Congress's creation of a new regulatory
regime embodying a national enterprise policy in the Code does not nec-
essarily mean that it will abandon the regulatory rules contained in sub-
chapter D.
One of the major changes of the 1981 Act, ACRS172 depreciation,
might also appear to be part of a nascent tax policy favoring investment.
It departs from the notion that capital expenditures should be ac-
counted for in a fashion that clearly reflects income. The history of
ACRS, however, shows that it is another subsidy provision, similar to
the investment tax credit, 173 properly scrutinizable by tax expenditure
167 d. § 415(c)(1)(A).
168 Id. § 415(b)(1)(A).
169 This was done by repealing I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(17) (Supp. V 1981) and (18) (1976); Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 237(b), 96 Stat. 327, 511.
170 I.R.C. § 416 (West Supp. 1983).
171 Id. §§ 402, 404, 501.
172 Id § 168.
173 The investment tax credit, id §§ 38, 46-50 (1976 & West Supp. 1983), is an extremely
complicated subsidy for the acquisition of certain capital goods. Congress has modified the
investment tax credit over the years in response to the needs of fiscal policy and also to en-
compass more types of investments. The tax credit's intricate rules seem on first blush to
resemble a regulatory regime, such as the pension regime. There are, however, significant
differences. The investment tax credit essentially is concerned with a single moment in time
for the particular taxpayer-when he invests. In this sense, it resembles a simple subsidy.
Unlike the other regulatory regimes discussed above, and a national enterprise policy, the
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analysis, and undertaken to foster the acquisition of capital goods. It
also reflects the revenue-income theme, in that it imprecisely attempts to
deal with the inflationary effects of historic cost depreciation. ACRS,
however, cannot be fitted into the nascent national enterprise policy
pattern.
It fairly can be asked whether the three provisions of the 1982 Act,
IRA liberalization, all saver certificates, and qualified dividend reinvest-
ment plans, differ materially from past bailouts made in the Code of
other troubled industries or companies. Penn Central, for example, ob-
tained a liberalization of the net operating loss carry forward rules, 174
and savings banks, until the Tax Reform Act of 1969175 began a ten-
year phase down, had the benefit of excessively generous, and fixed, de-
ductions for loan loss reserve set asides which were, in effect, a subsidy.
Neither of these provisions did much more than reduce a tax bill. Con-
gress intended them to aid financially troubled industries rather than to
encourage people to support a particular activity such as savings.
The three provisions of the 1982 Act, by comparison, are designed
to do more than merely grant a subsidy to the IRA adopter, all-saver-
certificate holder, or dividend-reinvesting shareholder. They attempt to
produce investment generally and in two industries in particular. The
contrast between the statutory contraction of savings bank reserves and
loan loss reserves and the inauguration of all saver certificates is instruc-
tive. Congress has repealed a simple subsidy while experimenting with
provisions tailored toward the newer goals represented by a national en-
terprise policy.
The development of a major regime for targeting investment of the
magnitude of the charitable or pension rules is far from certain. The
1981 and 1982 Acts do appear, however, to be moving in that direction,
and not because of the persuasiveness of the consumption tax idea.
subsidy goes to the person who acquires the capital good and maybe also in the long run to
the seller of the goods by making the goods somewhat less expensive. By contrast, the three
regulatory regimes grant a subsidy to X, the charitable donor, for example, and then a sub-
sidy to Y, the charitable donee, so that something will happen for the nation at large or for
some particular class of needy people. In addition, the charitable regime monitors behavior
at many points after the point of donation unlike the investment tax credit.
The investment tax credit is distinguishable from a national enterprise policy for another
reason. A national enterprise policy, whether focused, as in the case of dividend reinvestment
plans, or unfocused, like the liberalized IRA, tries to produce the actual investment in indus-
try. The investment tax credit encourages a business to acquire certain capital goods. Once
acquired, the Code becomes indifferent to what follows. A national enterprise policy thus
attempts to produce a more durable and generally less specific investment than the Code's
more traditional investment subsidies, such as the investment tax credit.
174 Id § 172(b) (West Supp. 1983).
175 Id. § 593. Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1901(a)(84)(A) provided for a reduction in the re-





Ending this article on a faintly prophetic note would beg the large
question implicitly presented here: Should Congress create another ma-
jor regulatory regime in the Internal Revenue Code, one focused on the
generation of investment in selected businesses, or in the business sector
generally? The unlikely elimination or curtailment by Congress of the
Code's role in achieving substantial regulatory goals, like those of the
pension system, does not constitute an argument for allowing another
major nonrevenue matter to be imported into the Code, even if the
Treasury and its Internal Revenue Service make up the finest regulatory
"agency" in the government. Robert Reich in a series of articles, now in
book form and titled The New Amen'can Frontier176 has called for the use
of tax incentives as part of an elaborate new national industrial policy.
The use of the Code and the Internal Revenue Service to further
national enterprise policy is inconsistent with the revenue-income theme
of the Code. The three arguments concerning the inconsistency of the
consumption tax with the revenue-income theme developed earlier ap-
ply equally well here.
First, an income tax is premised for philosophical reasons on taxing
all income, because income represents a form of disposable wealth. The
consumption tax is premised on taxing the consumption of wealth. A
tax-based national enterprise policy conflicts with the accretion ideal be-
cause it distinguishes, like each of the three ERTA changes, between a
socially desirable and a nonsocially desirable application of funds for a
nontax purpose which does not reduce wealth.
Second, the macroeconomic argument against a consumption tax
also applies to a tax-based national enterprise policy. If savings and na-
tional income have some symbiotic relationship, even if not precisely
reducible to formula, and if certain investments are thought desirable
outside of a normal market operation, then the surest way to accomplish
this is by honest and direct intervention, along the lines of the British
national enterprise policy. The British National Enterprise Board has a
budget which it must keep within. It does not operate in the relative
obscurity of deductions taken on the returns of wealthy investors craving
tax deductions or exemptions. Rather, the Board operates so that issues
of social and economic desirability are always on the surface.
Some, no doubt, will argue that any national enterprise policy is
undesirable because it interferes with the operation of the "market."
The problem with this argument is that our society, like European socie-
ties, is not willing to tolerate an untrammeled operation of the market.
Thus, pretending that we do not already have a national enterprise pol-
176 See Reich, The New Amen'can Frontier, THE ATLANTIC, Apr. 1983, at 97, 105.
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icy, composed of various tax subsidies and some direct programs, like
the Chrysler and Lockheed assistance measures, ensures that decisions
along these lines will be made at the last minute, on an ad hoc basis, and
that national enterprise goals will be accomplished indirectly by tax de-
ductions and loan guarantees rather than by direct investments or sub-
ventions to industry.
An additional facet of the macroeconomic argument that distin-
guishes a national enterprise board from a consumption tax is that it can
be funded and operated in a fashion more sensitive to business cycles. A
consumption tax always would favor savings and presumably invest-
ment. A national enterprise board could be funded heavily in times of
inflationary pressure by using the income tax to tamp down demand by
taking money out of the economy. This, in effect, is what was done
during World War II.
The third argument made against a consumption tax is that be-
cause the relationship among savings, consumption, and income is so
poorly understood, it is undesirable to design or implement a major
change in the income tax law based on a fixed notion of the relationship
of these aggregates. The same argument applies to a tax-based national
enterprise policy. The creation of a national enterprise board in the
United States that uses most of its resources to prop up the United
States equivalent of a British Leyland would be undesirable. This is not
to say that one facet of a national enterprise policy should not be to
soften or slow the collapse of major industries. But this objective is only
one of the objectives of such a policy. A further policy is the provision of
capital to promising new industries and assistance to industries, such as
housing, thought to be worthy of long-term social subsidy.
Finally, and by way of qualification, this article does not consider
fully the arguments for and against, or the proper institutional design of,
a national enterprise policy. We already have such a policy. In terms of
the major themes of our income tax, such a policy is better developed by
direct activity than by tax subsidies administered in what will, no
doubt, develop into a complex regime of rules governing qualification
for such subsidies.
The only aspects of a tax-based national enterprise policy that
might make it more attractive to Congress than a direct program relate
to issues of control and flexibility. A tax-based regime leaves the decision
of whether to invest primarily in private, even if preponderantly
wealthy, hands. When individuals decline to participate in such a pro-
gram, as they did with the all saver certificate program, it dies. In con-
trast, a national enterprise policy administered by a governmental
agency inevitably is more decisive. Once a course of action is under-
taken, bureaucracies tend to value consistency. Thus, one advantage of
a tax-based national enterprise policy, even if constructed haphazardly,
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like our nascent policy, is that it does not involve the heavy hand of an
institution, but instead represents the aggregate of thousands of uncon-
trolled, if influenced, decisions.
CONCLUSION
The liberalized IRA deduction and certain other provisions in the
1981 Act point in the direction of a comprehensive tax-directed effort to
increase generally national investment with an emphasis on investment
in particular industries. The roots of such a "national enterprise policy"
are not in the persuasiveness of the argument for a consumption tax, but
rather in the growing share of gross domestic product which public ex-
penditures consume. As the public sector takes an increasing portion of
national income, it must undertake heretofore private activities such as
investment.
The development of a national enterprise policy based wholly or
partially in the Internal Revenue Code is undesirable because it awards
subsidies disproportionately to higher income people, thus negating the
central premise of the tax system; to tax wealth, and therefore income,
at least proportionately. The national enterprise policy thus should be
removed from the Code and administered directly as a government pro-
gram along the lines of the British program. The major costs of remov-
ing it from the Code ironically are nontax costs; a tax-based policy,
because it awards a subsidy based on numerous private acts, leaves the
decisions and ownership of the investments in private hands. A
thoughtful Congress might endeavor to design innovatively a direct na-
tional enterprise policy to obtain these advantages. If a direct policy
cannot be structured effectively, Congress should determine forthrightly
whether the nontax advantages of a national enterprise policy justify
further derogation of the central principles of the income tax.
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